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espite multiplying good news from the real economy, the past six months have 
been the most testing for the euro area since the acute phase of the financial 
crisis at the end of 2008. Mounting doubts on the sustainability of sovereign 
debt are pushing spreads over the German Bund rates to unprecedented heights.  
The sustainability of sovereign debt is a serious issue that must be confronted: the 
combination of large public sector deficits to support economic activity and persistently 
weak private demand raises questions of debt sustainability in the medium term. 
However, financial markets seem to have blown these fears out of proportion, leading 
to a full-scale confidence crisis: after all, Greece’s public debt is a tiny proportion of 
eurozone GDP and bank capital and there are no serious grounds for believing that 
another eurozone member will become insolvent any time soon. Evidence presented 
below suggests that politicians’ public disagreements and careless statements at critical 
junctures may have added oil to incipient fire: by creating the impression that domestic 
political interests would take precedence over orderly management of the Greek debt 
crisis, they raised broader doubts on their ability to address fundamental economic 
divergences within the area, which are the real source of debt sustainability problems in 
the medium term. 
The figure at the end of this commentary reports daily spreads for 10-year government 
debt between Germany, on the one hand, and Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and France 
on the other. We have also indicated in the figure significant events that coincided with 
observed changes in spread patterns (events are indicated with numbers referring to the 
events chronicled in the list that follows). 
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As may be seen, up until the beginning of February 2010, by and large the Greek crisis 
is just that, a Greek crisis, reflected in the widening spread relative to all other 
government paper. But in the ensuing weeks all spreads start to widen and in the 
period of most acute instability in April and May all spreads follow similar patterns 
both in their upswings and downswings – albeit in different scale. Markets were 
somehow coming to believe that government insolvency would spread from one 
country to another, leading eventually to a banking crisis.  
Let’s consider events at critical changes in market spreads. On 8 December 2009, Fitch 
cut its rating on Greek debt below A grade (event 1), calling markets’ attention to a 
deteriorating outlook; but the real jump in the spread, 170 basis points raising it to 
nearly 400 basis points, happens in the fortnight following the announcement that debt 
data had been falsified on 12 January 2010 (event 3). On that occasion, Chancellor 
Merkel declared that Greece’s mounting deficits risked hurting the euro; the statement 
was subsequently removed from the German government website. 
The ensuing days were marked by confusing public statements, with reassurances by 
the European Commission apparently pushing spreads down (events 5 and 6) and 
tough German statements pushing them back up (events 7 and 8). March was also 
marked by great confusion, with Greece declaring that financial assistance was not 
needed and Germany implicitly using that statement to reassure domestic public 
opinion that German money would not be called upon. Germany and other member 
states at that time also called for the IMF to intervene in case of need. The effect was 
renewed uncertainty on the real willingness of eurozone members to support Greece.  
On March 25th eurozone member states agreed on a rescue package for Greece 
involving bilateral loans as well as IMF financing (event 11); however, Greece still 
refused to ask for it while the eurozone member states started bickering in public over 
the conditions applicable to the loan – with Germany demanding above-market rates 
that would of course make Greek debt even less sustainable; the request was later 
withdrawn (event 13-a). The spread on Greek paper trespassed 400 basis points and 
started climbing to new heights since early April; other spreads also rose sharply. The 
key novelty here seems the decision, taken on April 11th, to extend aid through bilateral 
loans (€30 billion from euro area member states, to be supplemented by the IMF; event 
13-b), a decision that for the first time focused market attention on the fact that 
eurozone governments would be directly liable for Greek debt – trashing the no-bail out 
clause of the Treaty.  
Following pronounced market unrest, on May 2nd the eurozone member states agreed 
on a €110 billion support package for Greece (of which €30 billion would come from the 
IMF, event 19), and Greece announced that it would finally take it. However, after 
initially receding, spreads widened again even more, with confidence fading in the 
whole eurozone. An emergency meeting of the Ecofin Council then agreed on a new 
European Financial Stabilisation mechanism entailing loans and guarantees up to €750 
billion – of which €440 billion would be raised through a new collective instrument, the 
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Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) entitled to raise money from world capital markets, €60 
billion from the European Commission and the rest from the IMF (event 21). No more 
bilateral loans: the lesson has been learnt, at a high cost. The ECB followed suit and on 
the same date announced a new package of liquidity support to meet renewed distress 
in the interbank market. The package included direct purchases of Greek and other 
eurozone government debt bonds by the European Central Bank.   
However, upon returning home, Mrs. Merkel announced a unilateral German ban on 
short selling that once again unsettled markets and pushed up spreads on the Bund 
(event 23), since it was seen as further indication of insufficient coordination. A German 
member of the ECB governing board publicly voiced his disagreement with ECB 
support to the sovereign debt market. After coming down sharply in the days 
immediately following the new measures, spreads have been crawling up in a climate 
of mistrust and confusing statements by eurozone governments. Good news from the 
economy and agreement within the Eurogroup on the Special Purpose Vehicle (event 
24) has so far not managed to calm the waters. 
In sum, governments may have contributed quite a bit to the turmoil with their public 
displays of confusion and their statements to assuage domestic public opinion: because 
their behaviour undermined the credibility of the specific actions they were taking and, 
more broadly, of their ability to effectively address underlying imbalances in the 
eurozone. The good news is that even this confused and ill-advised bunch was 
eventually forced to come together and approve unprecedented measures to rescue the 
euro from disaster. At the recent meeting of the European Council on June 17th, they 
have now agreed to publish in July the results of stress tests on 25 large banks in the 
area (event 26) – which should help dissipate uncertainty on their real exposures. If 
eurozone governments continue to show unity of purpose and the serious intention to 
address underlying imbalances threatening the sustainability of the euro, there is hope 
that financial markets will relent and accept that the eurozone is not about to crumble.  
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10-year government bonds spread versus German bund for selected eurozone countries, 
December 2009-June 2010 (in percent)* 
 
* Daily data. Especially bad news appears in red. 
Source: Financial Times on Thomson Reuters.  
 
Timeline of significant events 
December 2009 – June 2010 
1) 8 December: Fitch cuts rating on Greek debt to BBB plus with negative outlook -– first 
time in 10 years a leading rating agency has rated Greece sovereign paper below A 
grade. 
2) 11 January: IMF announces mission to Athens. 
3) 12 January: Greece is condemned by the European Commission for falsifying data on its 
public finances. Angela Merkel says that Greece’s mounting deficit risks hurting the 
euro, which faces a “very difficult phase” in the coming years (comment posted on a 
government website and later removed). Three days later Merkel praises the “Herculean 
effort” of Greek government to tame the budget deficit. 
4) 28 January: Bungled attempt by Greece to sell government debt to China becomes 
public. 
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5) 9 February: EU Commission (Olli Rehn) offers “support in broad sense” to Greece – 
German government reported to be preparing an assistance package for Greece, though 
depending on “strict conditions”. 
6) 11 February: Eurozone leaders promise support to Greece in exchange for deficit 
reduction plan. 
7) 15 February: Greece to lose voting privileges in the EU in case of bailout, says Kurt 
Lauk, head of CDU’s Economic Council.  
8) 24 February: Hans Michelbach, influential CSU lawmaker, says that Germany must 
resist any move to provide financial aid to Greece because any assistance would 
provoke a “spiral without end”. 
9) 11 March: Wolfgang Schäuble calls for tough sanctions to back an EMF (European 
Monetary Fund), so as to enforce budgetary discipline, including expulsion from 
eurozone as a last resort sanction. 
10) 21 March: Merkel: “I do not see Greece needs money at the moment, and the Greek 
government has confirmed that. We do not want to create unrest in the markets by 
raising false expectations.” 
11) 25 March: Euro area agrees on emergency plan for Greece, but immediately after 
divergent interpretations of agreement surface between member states and unsettle 
markets. 
12) 9 April: German government demands emergency financial aid to Greece be at close to 
market rates. 
13) 11 April: a) Germany agrees to lend to Greece at below market interest rates; b) 
Eurozone members commit to provide up to €30 billion in loans to Greece, to be 
supplemented by money from the International Monetary Fund that could yield an 
additional €15 billion. 
14) 22 April: Moody’s cuts Greece’s rating for the second time in the year. German 
government lawmaker Frank Schaeffler says Greece should be prepared to leave the 
euro region if it can’t push through enough austerity measures to cut its budget deficit. 
15) 23 April: Greece asks activation of eurozone/IMF loan – EU says terms of aid may be 
agreed in a matter of days, but Merkel says Greek government must satisfy very 
stringent conditions. 
16) 26-27 April: Merkel says she won’t give funds until Greece shows it has a sustainable 
credible plan to cut its budget deficit – “I have said for weeks that Greece must do its 
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homework first”- “Germany will help when the correspondent conditions are fulfilled”. 
Standard and Poor’s downgrades Greece’s long-term credit rating to junk. 
17) 29-30 April: emergency multi-annual loan programme for Greece from eurozone and 
IMF announced to be concluded within days. Greece adopts €24 billion austerity 
package – Merkel confident it will keep the euro stable. 
18) 1 May: Merkel says EU should be able to temporarily revoke voting rights from member 
states who violate deficit limits. 
19) 2-3 May: €110 billion eurozone-IMF support package for Greece adopted. ECB relaxes 
collateral policy for Greek sovereign debt. 
20) 7 May: German Parliament approves law to release funds (€22.4 billion) to Greece. 
21) 10 May: EU stabilisation mechanism adopted (€500 billion from eurozone and EU; €250 
billion from the IMF). European Central Bank adopts package of measures to ease 
tensions in financial markets, including purchase of eurozone government bonds and 
reactivation of US dollar swap lines with the Federal Reserve. German court refuses to 
block Athens rescue. 
22) 15-16 May: Merkel: “if euro fails, more fails”. Germany calls for eurozone budget laws 
(based on German model). 
23) 18 May: Germany adopts ban on short-selling. 
24) 7 June: Eurozone ministers establish the €440 billion SPV (the European Financial 
Stability Facility) envisaged in the May 10th package and find an agreement on its 
functioning. 
25) 14 June: Moody’s downgrades Greek sovereign debt to junk. 
26) 17 June: EU leaders decide that detailed results of stress tests on the health of 25 big 
European banks be made public. 
 
